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Abstract
A problem of optimal debt management is modeled as a noncooperative game between
a borrower and a pool of lenders, in infinite time horizon with exponential discount. The
yearly income of the borrower is governed by a stochastic process. When the debt-to-
income ratio x(t) reaches a given size x∗, bankruptcy instantly occurs. The interest rate
charged by the risk-neutral lenders is precisely determined in order to compensate for this
possible loss of their investment.
For a given bankruptcy threshold x∗, existence and properties of optimal feedback
strategies for the borrower are studied, in a stochastic framework as well as in a limit
deterministic setting. The paper also analyzes how the expected total cost to the borrower
changes, depending on different values of x∗.
1 Introduction
We consider a problem of optimal debt management in infinite time horizon, modeled as a
noncooperative game between a borrower and a pool of risk-neutral lenders. Since the debtor
may go bankrupt, lenders charge a higher interest rate to offset the possible loss of part of
their investment.
In the models studied in [7, 8], the borrower has a fixed income, but large values of the debt
determine a bankruptcy risk. Namely, if at a given time t the debt-to-income ratio x(t) is too
big, there is a positive probability that panic spreads among investors and bankruptcy occurs
within a short interval [t, t+ ε]. This event is similar to a bank run. Calling TB the random
bankruptcy time, this means
Prob
{
TB ∈ [t, t+ ε]
∣∣∣TB > t} = ρ(x(t)) · ε+ o(ε).
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Here the “instantaneous bankruptcy risk” ρ(·) is a given, nondecreasing function.
At all times t, the borrower must allocate a portion u(t) ∈ [0, 1] of his income to service the
debt, i.e., paying back the principal together with the running interest. Our analysis will be
mainly focused on the existence and properties of an optimal repayment strategy u = u∗(x)
in feedback form.
In the alternative model proposed by Nun˜o and Thomas in [13], the yearly income Y (t) is
modeled as a stochastic process:
dY (t) = µY (t) dt+ σY (t) dW. (1.1)
Here µ ≥ 0 is an exponential growth rate, while W denotes Brownian motion on a filtered
probability space. Differently from [7, 8], in [13] it is the borrower himself that chooses when
to declare bankruptcy. This decision will be taken when the debt-to-income ratio reaches a
certain threshold x∗, beyond which the burden of servicing the debt becomes worse than the
cost of bankruptcy.
At the time Tb when bankruptcy occurs, we assume that the borrower pays a fixed price B,
while lenders recover a fraction θ(x(Tb)) ∈ [0, 1] of their outstanding capital. Here x 7→ θ(x)
is a nondecreasing function of the debt size. For example, the borrower may hold an amount
R0 of collateral (gold reserves, real estate. . .) which will be proportionally divided among
creditors if bankruptcy occurs. In this case, when bankruptcy occurs each investor will receive
a fraction
θ(x(Tb)) = max
{
R0
x(Tb)
, 1
}
(1.2)
of his outstanding capital.
Aim of the present paper is to provide a detailed mathematical analysis of some models closely
related to [13]. We stress that these problems are very different from a standard problem of
optimal control. Indeed, the interest rate charged by lenders is not given a priori. Rather,
it is determined by the expected evolution of the debt at all future times. Hence it depends
globally on the entire feedback control u(·). A “solution” must be understood as a Nash
equilibrium, where the strategy implemented by the borrower represents the best reply to the
strategy adopted by the lenders, and conversely.
Our main results can be summarized as follows.
• We first assume that value x∗ at which bankruptcy occurs is a priori given, and seek an
optimal feedback control u = u∗(x) which minimizes the expected cost to the borrower.
For any value σ ≥ 0 of the diffusion coefficient in (1.1), we prove that the problem admits
at least one Nash equilibrium solution, in feedback form. In the deterministic case where
σ = 0, the solution can be constructed by concatenating solutions of a system of two
ODEs, with terminal data given at x = x∗.
• We then study how the expected total cost of servicing the debt together with the
bankruptcy cost (exponentially discounted in time), are affected by different choices
of x∗.
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Let θ(x∗) ∈ [0, 1] be the salvage rate, i.e., the fraction of outstanding capital that will
be payed back to lenders if bankruptcy occurs when the debt-to-income ratio is x∗. If
lim
s→+∞
θ(s) s = +∞, (1.3)
then, letting x∗ → +∞, the total expected cost to the borrower goes to zero. On the
other hand, if
lim
s→+∞
θ(s) s < +∞, (1.4)
then the total expected cost to the borrower remains uniformly positive as x∗ → +∞.
We remark that the assumption (1.4) is quite realistic. For example, if (1.2) holds, then
θ(x∗)x∗ = R0 for all x
∗ large enough. We remark that (1.4) rules out the possibility of a
Ponzi scheme, where the old debt is serviced by initiating more and more new loans. Indeed,
if (1.4) holds, then such a strategy will cause the total debt to blow up to infinity in finite
time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe more carefully the
model, deriving the equations satisfied by the value function V and the discounted bond price
p. In Sections 3 and 4 we construct equilibrium solutions in feedback form, in the stochastic
case (σ > 0) and in the deterministic case (σ = 0), respectively. Finally, Sections 5 and
6 contain an analysis of how the expected cost to the borrower changes, depending on the
bankruptcy threshold x∗.
In the economics literature, some related models of debt and bankruptcy can be found in
[1, 3, 7, 11, 12]. A general introduction to Nash equilibria and differential games can be found
in [5, 6]. For the basic theory of optimal control and viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations we refer to [4, 9].
2 A model with stochastic growth
We consider a slight variant of the model in [13]. We denote by X(t) the total debt of a
borrower (a government, or a private company) at time t. The annual income Y (t) of the
borrower is assumed to be a random process, governed by the stochastic evolution equation
(1.1).
The debt is financed by issuing bonds. When an investor buys a bond of unit nominal value,
he receives a continuous stream of payments with intensity (r + λ)e−λt. Here
• r is the interest rate payed on bonds, which we assume coincides with the discount rate,
• λ is the rate at which the borrower pays back the principal.
If no bankruptcy occurs, the payoff for an investor will thus be∫ ∞
0
e−r(r + λ)e−λt dt = 1.
In case of bankruptcy, a lender recovers only a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of his outstanding capital.
Here θ can depend on the total amount of debt at the time on bankruptcy. To offset this
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possible loss, the investor buys a bond with unit nominal value at a discounted price p ∈ [0, 1].
As in [8, 13], at any time t the value p(t) is uniquely determined by the competition of a pool
of risk-neutral lenders.
We call U(t) the rate of payments that the borrower chooses to make to his creditors, at time t.
If this amount is not enough to cover the running interest and pay back part of the principal,
new bonds are issued, at the discounted price p(t). The nominal value of the outstanding debt
thus evolves according to
X˙(t) = −λX(t) +
(λ+ r)X(t)− U(t)
p(t)
. (2.1)
The debt-to-income ratio is defined as x = X/Y . In view of (1.1) and (2.1), Ito’s formula
[14, 15] yields the stochastic evolution equation
dx(t) =
[(
λ+ r
p(t)
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x(t)−
u(t)
p(t)
]
dt− σ x(t) dW. (2.2)
Here u = U/Y is the portion of the total income allocated to pay for the debt. Throughout
the following we assume r > µ. We observe that, if r < µ, then the borrower’s income grows
faster than the debt (even if no payment is ever made). In this case, with probability one the
debt-to-income ratio would approach zero as t→ +∞.
In this model, the borrower has two controls. At each time t he can decide the portion u(t) of
the total income which he allocates to repay the debt. Moreover, he can decide at what time
Tb bankruptcy is declared. Throughout the following, we consider a control in feedback form,
so that
u = u∗(x) for x ∈ [0, x∗], (2.3)
while bankruptcy is declared as soon as x(t) reaches the value x∗. The bankruptcy time is
thus the random variable
Tb
.
= inf
{
t > 0 ; x(t) = x∗
}
. (2.4)
At first, we let x∗ be a given upper bound to the size of the debt. In a later section, we shall
regard x∗ as an additional control parameter, chosen by the borrower in order to minimize his
expected cost.
Given an initial size x0 of the debt, the total expected cost to the borrower, exponentially
discounted in time, is thus computed as
J [x0, u
∗, x∗] = E
[∫ Tb
0
e−rtL(u∗(x(t))) dt + e−rTbB
]
x(0)=x0
. (2.5)
Here B is a large constant, accounting for the bankruptcy cost, while L(u) is the instantaneous
cost for the borrower to implement the control u. In the following we shall assume
(A) The cost function L is twice continuously differentiable for u ∈ [0, 1[ and satisfies
L(0) = 0, L′ > 0, L′′ > 0, lim
u→1−
L(u) = +∞. (2.6)
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For example, one may take
L(u) = c ln
1
1− u
, or L(u) =
cu
(1− u)α
,
for some c, α > 0.
Fix x∗ > 0. For a given initial debt x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, x
∗], we define the corresponding value
function as
V (x0) = inf
u∗(·)
J [x0, u
∗, x∗] . (2.7)
Under the assumptions (A) we have
V (0) = 0 , V (x∗) = B . (2.8)
Denote by
H(x, ξ, p)
.
= min
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)−
ξ
p
ω
}
+
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x ξ (2.9)
the Hamiltonian associated to the dynamics (2.2) and the cost function L in (2.5). Notice
that, as long as p > 0, the function H is differentiable with Lipschitz continuous derivatives
w.r.t. all arguments.
By a standard arguments, the value function V provides a solution to the second order ODE
rV (x) = H
(
x, V ′(x), p(x)
)
+
(σx)2
2
V ′′(x) , (2.10)
with boundary conditions (2.8). As soon as the function V is determined, the optimal feedback
control is recovered by
u∗(x) = argmin
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)−
V ′(x)
p(x)
ω
}
.
By (A) this yields
u∗(x) =

0 if
V ′(x)
p(x)
≤ L′(0) ,
(L′)−1
(
V ′(x)
p(x)
)
if
V ′(x)
p(x)
> L′(0) .
(2.11)
Assuming that lenders are risk-neutral, the discounted bond price p is determined by
p(x0) = E
[ ∫ Tb
0
(r + λ)e−(r+λ)tdt+ e−(r+λ)Tbθ(x∗)
]
x(0)=x0
, (2.12)
where θ denotes the salvage rate. In other words, if bankruptcy occurs when the debt-to-
income ratio is x∗, then investors receive a fraction θ(x∗) ∈ [0, 1] of the nominal value of their
holding. Notice that the random variable Tb in (2.4) now depends on the initial state x0, the
threshold x∗, and on the feedback control u∗(·).
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By the Feynman-Kac formula, p(·) satisfies the equation
(r + λ)(p(x) − 1) =
[(
λ+ r
p(x)
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x−
u∗(x)
p(x)
]
· p′(x) +
(σx)2
2
p′′(x), (2.13)
with boundary values
p(0) = 1, p(x∗) = θ(x∗) . (2.14)
Combining (2.10) and (2.13), we are thus led to the system of second order ODEs
rV (x) = H
(
x, V ′(x), p(x)
)
+
(σx)2
2
· V ′′(x) ,
(r + λ)(p(x) − 1) = Hξ
(
x, V ′(x), p(x)
)
· p′(x) +
(σx)2
2
· p′′(x) ,
(2.15)
with the boundary conditions
V (0) = 0,
V (x∗) = B,

p(0) = 1,
p(x∗) = θ(x∗).
(2.16)
We close this section by collecting some useful properties of the Hamiltonian function.
Lemma 2.1. Let the assumptions (A) hold. Then, for all ξ ≥ 0 and p ∈ [0, 1], the function
H in (2.9) satisfies(
(λ+ r)x− 1
p
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)x
)
ξ ≤ H(x, ξ, p) ≤
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
xξ, (2.17)
(λ+ r)x− 1
p
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)x ≤ Hξ(x, ξ, p) ≤
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x. (2.18)
Moreover, for every x, p > 0 the map ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is concave down and satisfies
H(x, 0, p) = 0, (2.19)
Hξ(x, 0, p) =
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x , (2.20)
lim
ξ→+∞
H(x, ξ, p) =

−∞, if
1
p
>
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x ,
+∞, if
1
p
≤
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x .
(2.21)
Proof.
1. Since H(x, ·, p) is defined as the infimum of a family of affine functions, it is concave down.
We observe that (2.9) implies
H(x, ξ, p) =
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
xξ if 0 ≤ ξ ≤ pL′(0). (2.22)
This yields the identities (2.19)-(2.20).
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2. Taking ω = 0 in (2.9) we obtain the upper bound in (2.17). By the concavity property, the
map ξ 7→ Hξ(x, ξ, p) is non-increasing. Hence (2.20) yields the upper bound in (2.18).
3. Since L(w) ≥ 0 for all w ∈ [0, 1], we have
H(x, ξ, p) ≥ min
w∈[0,1]
{
−
ξ
p
w
}
+
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x ξ
and obtain the lower bound in (2.17). On the other hand, using the optimality condition,
one computes from (2.9) that
Hξ(x, ξ, p) =
(λ+ r)x− u∗(ξ, p)
p
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)x (2.23)
where
u∗(ξ, p) = argmin
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)−
ξ
p
ω
}
= (L′)−1
(
ξ
p
)
< 1 .
Observe that, as ξ → +∞, one has u∗(ξ, p)→ 1 in (2.23). The non-increasing property of
the map ξ → Hξ(x, ξ, p) yields the lower bound in (2.18).
4. To prove (2.21) we observe that, in the first case, there exists ω0 < 1 such that
ω0
p
>
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x.
Hence, letting ξ → +∞ we obtain
lim
ξ→+∞
H(x, ξ, p) ≤ lim
ξ→+∞
[
L(ω0)−
ω0
p
ξ +
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x ξ
]
= −∞ .
To handle the second case, we observe that, for ξ > 0 large, the minimum in (2.9) is
attained at the unique point ω(ξ) where L′(ω(ξ)) = ξ/p. Hence lim
ξ→+∞
ω(ξ) = 1 and
lim
ξ→+∞
H(x, ξ, p) = lim
ξ→+∞
[
L(ω(ξ))−
ω(ξ)
p
ξ +
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x ξ
]
≥ lim
ξ→+∞
L(ω(ξ)) = +∞.
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3 Existence of solutions
Let x∗ > 0 be given. If a solution (V, p) to the boundary value problem (2.15)-(2.16) is found,
then the feedback control u = u∗(x) defined at (2.11) and the function p = p(x) provide an
equilibrium solution to the debt management problem. In other words, for every initial value
x0 of the debt, the following holds.
(i) Consider the stochastic dynamics (2.2), with u(t) = u∗(x(t)) and p(t) = p(x(t)). Then
for every x0 ∈ [0, x
∗] the identity (2.12) holds, where Tb is the random bankruptcy time
defined at (2.4) .
(ii) Given the discounted price p = p(x), for every initial data x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, x
∗] the
feedback control u = u∗(x) is optimal for the stochastic optimization problem
minimize: E
[∫ Tb
0
e−rtL(u∗(x(t))) dt + e−rTbB
]
. (3.1)
with stochastic dynamics (2.2), where p(t) = p(x(t)).
To construct a solution to the system (2.15)-(2.16), we consider the auxiliary parabolic system
Vt(t, x) = − rV (t, x) +H
(
x, Vx(t, x), p(t, x)
)
+
(σx)2
2
· Vxx(t, x) ,
pt(t, x) = (r + λ)(1− p(t, x)) +Hξ
(
x, Vx(t, x), p(t, x)
)
· px(t, x) +
(σx)2
2
· pxx(t, x) ,
(3.2)
with boundary conditions (2.16). Following [2], the main idea is to construct a compact,
convex set of functions (V, p) : [0, x∗] 7→ [0, B]× [θ(x∗), 1] which is positively invariant for the
parabolic evolution problem. A topological technique will then yield the existence of a steady
state, i.e. a solution to (2.15)-(2.16).
Theorem 3.1. In addition to (A), assume that σ > 0 and θ(x∗) > 0. Then the system of
second order ODEs (2.15) with boundary conditions (2.16) admits a C2 solution (V , p¯), such
that V : [0, x∗]→ [0, B] is increasing and p¯ : [0, x∗]→ [θ(x∗), 1] is decreasing.
Proof.
1. For any ε > 0, consider the parabolic system
Vt = − rV +H(x, Vx, p) +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
Vxx ,

V (0) = 0,
V (x∗) = B,
(3.3)
pt = (r+λ)(1−p)+Hξ(x, Vx, p)px+
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
pxx ,

p(0) = 1,
p(x∗) = θ(x∗) .
(3.4)
obtained from (3.2) by adding the terms εVxx, εpxx on the right hand sides. For any ε > 0,
this renders the system uniformly parabolic, also in a neighborhood of x = 0.
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2. Adopting a semigroup notation, let t 7→ (V (t), p(t)) = St(V0, p0) be the solution of the
system (3.3)-(3.4), with initial data
V (0, x) = V0(x), p(0, x) = p0(x). (3.5)
Consider the closed, convex set of functions
D =
{
(V, p) : [0, x∗] 7→ [0, B]× [θ(x∗), 1] ; V, p ∈ C2, Vx ≥ 0, px ≤ 0, and (2.16) holds
}
.
(3.6)
We claim that the above domain is positively invariant under the semigroup S, namely
St(D) ⊆ D for all t ≥ 0 . (3.7)
Indeed, consider the constant functions
V +(t, x) = B,
V −(t, x) = 0,

p+(t, x) = 1,
p−(t, x) = θ(x∗) .
Recalling (2.19), one easily checks that V + is a supersolution and V − is a subsolution of
the scalar parabolic problem (3.3). Indeed
−rV + +H(x, V +x , p) +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
V +xx ≤ 0, V
+(t, 0) ≥ 0, V +(t, x∗) ≥ B.
−rV − +H(x, V −x , p) +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
V −xx ≥ 0, V
−(t, 0) ≤ 0, V −(t, x∗) ≤ B.
Similarly, p+ is a supersolution and p− is a subsolution of the scalar parabolic problem
(3.4).
This proves that, if the initial data V0, p0 in (3.5) take values in the box [0, B]× [θ(x
∗), 1],
then for every t ≥ 0 the solution of the system (3.3)-(3.4) will satisfy
0 ≤ V (t, x) ≤ B, θ(x∗) ≤ p(t, x) ≤ 1, (3.8)
for all x ∈ [0, x∗]. In turn, this implies
Vx(t, 0) ≥ 0,
Vx(t, x
∗) ≥ 0,

px(t, 0) ≤ 0,
px(t, x
∗) ≤ 0 .
(3.9)
3. Next, we prove that the monotonicity properties of V (t, ·) and p(t, ·) are preserved in time.
Differentiating w.r.t. x one obtains
Vxt = − rVx +Hx +HξVxx +Hppx + σ
2xVxx +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
Vxxx , (3.10)
9
pxt = − (r+ λ)px+
(
d
dx
Hξ(x, Vx, p)
)
px+Hξpxx+σ
2xpxx+
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
pxxx . (3.11)
By (2.19), for every x, p one hasHx(x, 0, p) = Hp(x, 0, p) = 0. Hence Vx ≡ 0 is a subsolution
of (3.10) and px ≡ 0 is a supersolution of (3.11). In view of (3.9), we obtain
px(t, x) ≤ 0 ≤ Vx(t, x) for all t ≥ 0, x ∈ [0, x
∗].
This concludes the proof that the set D in (3.6) is positively invariant for the system
(3.3)-(3.4).
4. Thanks to the bounds (2.17)-(2.18), we can now apply Theorem 3 in [2] and obtain the
existence of a steady state (V ε, pε) ∈ D for the system (3.3)-(3.4).
We recall the main argument in [2]. For every T > 0 the map (V0, p0) 7→ ST (V0, p0) is a
compact transformation of the closed convex domain D into itself. By Schauder’s theorem
it has a fixed point. This yields a periodic solution of the parabolic system (3.3)-(3.4), with
period T . Letting T → 0, one obtains a steady state.
5. It now remains to derive a priori estimates on this stationary solution, which will allow to
take the limit as ε→ 0. Consider any solution to
−rV +H(x, V ′, p) +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
V ′′ = 0 ,
(r + λ)(1− p) +Hξ(x, V
′, p)p′ +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
p′′ = 0 ,
(3.12)
with V increasing, p decreasing, and satisfying the boundary conditions (2.16).
By the properties of H derived in Lemma 2.1, we can find δ > 0 small enough and ξ0 > 0
such that the following implication holds:
x ∈ [0, δ], p ∈ [θ(x∗), 1], ξ ≥ ξ0 =⇒ H(x, ξ, p) ≤ 0 .
As a consequence, if V ′(x) > ξ0 for some x ∈ [0, δ], then the first equation in (3.12) implies
V ′′(x) ≥ 0. We conclude that either V ′(x) ≤ ξ0 for all x ∈ [0, x
∗], or else V ′ attains its
maximum on the subinterval [δ, x∗].
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a point xˆ ∈ [δ, x∗] where
V ′(xˆ) =
V (x∗)− V (δ)
x∗ − δ
≤
B
x∗ − δ
. (3.13)
By (2.17), the derivative V ′ satisfies a differential inequality of the form
|V ′′| ≤ c1|V
′|+ c2 , x ∈ [δ, x
∗] . (3.14)
for suitable constants c1, c2. By Gronwall’s lemma, from the differential inequality (3.14)
and the estimate (3.13) one obtains a uniform bound on V ′(x), for all x ∈ [δ, xˆ] ∪ [xˆ, x∗].
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6. Similar arguments apply to p′. By (2.18), the term Hξ(x, V
′, p) in (3.12) is uniformly
bounded. For every δ > 0, by (3.12) shows that p′ satisfies a linear ODE whose coefficients
remain bounded on [δ, x∗], uniformly w.r.t. ε. This yields the bound
|p′(x)| ≤ Cδ for all x ∈ [δ, x
∗]
for some constant Cδ, uniformly valid as ε→ 0.
To make sure that, as ε→ 0, the limit satisfies the boundary value p(0) = 1. one needs to
provide a lower bound on p also in a neighborhood of x = 0, independent of ε. Introduce
the constant
γ
.
= min
{
1 , (r + λ)
(
λ+ r
θ(x∗)
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)−1}
.
Then define
p−(x)
.
= 1− cxγ ,
choosing c > 0 so that p−(x∗) = θ(x∗). We claim that the convex function p− is a lower
solution of the second equation in (3.12). Indeed, by (3.12), one has
(r + λ)cxγ −Hξ(x, V
′, p) cγxγ−1 ≥
[
(r + γ)−
(
λ+ r
θ(x∗)
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
γ
]
cxγ ≥ 0.
7. Letting ε → 0, we now consider a sequence (V ε, pε) of solutions to (3.12) with bound-
ary conditions (2.16). Thanks to the previous estimates, the functions V ε are uniformly
Lipschitz continuous on [0, x∗], while the functions pε are Lipschitz continuous on any
subinterval [δ, x∗] and satisfy
p−(x) ≤ pε(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0, x∗], ε > 0.
By choosing a suitable subsequence, we achieve the uniform convergence (V ε, pε)→ (V, p),
where V, p are twice continuously differentiable on the open interval ]0, x∗[, and satisfy the
boundary conditions (2.16).
4 The deterministic case
If σ = 0, then the stochastic equation (2.2) reduces to the deterministic control system
x˙ =
(
λ+ r
p
− λ− µ
)
x−
u
p
. (4.1)
We then consider the deterministic Debt Management Problem.
(DMP) Given an initial value x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, x
∗] of the debt, minimize∫ Tb
0
e−rtL(u(t)) dt+ e−rTbB , (4.2)
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subject to the dynamics (4.1), where the bankruptcy time Tb is defined as in (2.4), while
p(t) =
∫ Tb
t
(r+λ)e−(r+λ)sds+e(−r+λ)(Tb−t)·θ(x∗) = 1−(1−θ(x∗)) e−(r+λ)(Tb−t) . (4.3)
Since in this case the optimal feedback control u∗ and the corresponding functions V, p may
not be smooth, a concept of equilibrium solution should be more carefully defined.
Definition 4.1 (Equilibrium solution in feedback form). A couple of piecewise Lipschitz
continuous functions u = u∗(x) and p = p∗(x) provide an equilibrium solution to the debt
management problem (DMP), with continuous value function V ∗, if
(i) For every x0 ∈ [0, x
∗], V ∗ is the minimum cost for the optimal control problem
minimize:
∫ Tb
0
e−rtL(u(x(t))) dt + e−rTbB, (4.4)
subject to
x˙(t) =
(
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ
)
x(t)−
u(t)
p∗(x(t))
, x(0) = x0 . (4.5)
Moreover, every Carathe´odory solution of (4.5) with u(t) = u∗(x(t)) is optimal.
(ii) For every x0 ∈ [0, x
∗], there exists at least one solution t 7→ x(t) of the Cauchy problem
x˙ =
(
λ+ r
p∗(x)
− λ− µ
)
x−
u∗(x)
p∗(x)
, x(0) = x0, (4.6)
such that
p∗(x0) =
∫ Tb
0
(r+ λ)e−(r+λ)tdt+ e(−r+λ)Tb θ(x∗) = 1− (1− θ(x∗)) · e−(r+λ)Tb , (4.7)
with Tb as in (2.4).
In the deterministic case, (2.15) takes the form
rV (x) = H
(
x, V ′(x), p(x)
)
,
(r + λ)(p(x)− 1) = Hξ
(
x, V ′(x), p(x)
)
p′(x) ,
(4.8)
with Hamiltonian function (see Fig. 4)
H(x, ξ, p) = min
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)−
ξ
p
ω
}
+
(
λ+ r
p
− (λ+ µ)
)
x ξ . (4.9)
We consider solutions to (4.8) with the boundary condition
V (0) = 0,
V (x∗) = B,

p(0) = 1,
p(x∗) = θ(x∗) .
(4.10)
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Introduce the function
Hmax(x, p)
.
= sup
ξ≥0
H(x, ξ, p) = L
(
(λ+ r)x− (λ+ µ)px
)
,
with the understanding that
Hmax(x, p) = +∞ if (λ+ r)x− (λ+ µ)px ≥ 1 . (4.11)
If (λ+ r)x− (λ+ µ)px < 1, recalling (4.1) we define
u♯(x, p) = (λ+ r)x− (λ+ µ)px . (4.12)
Notice that u♯ is the control that keeps the debt x constant in time. This value u♯ achieves
the minimum in (4.9) when
L′
(
(λ+ r)x− (λ+ µ)px
)
=
ξ
p
.
This motivates the definition
ξ♯(x, p)
.
= argmax
ξ≥0
H(x, ξ, p) = pL′
(
(λ+ r)x− (λ+ µ)px
)
. (4.13)
On the other hand, if (λ+ r)x− (λ+µ)px ≥ 1, then the function ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is monotone
increasing and we define ξ♯(x, p)
.
= +∞. Observe that
Hξξ(x, ξ, p) ≤ 0 ,

Hξ(x, ξ, p) > 0 for all 0 ≤ ξ < ξ
♯(x, p) ,
Hξ(x, ξ, p) < 0 for all ξ > ξ
♯(x, p) .
(4.14)
We regard the first equation in (4.8) as an implicit ODE for the function V . For every x ≥ 0
and p ∈ [0, 1], if rV (x) > Hmax(x, p), then this equation has no solution. On the other hand,
when
0 ≤ rV (x) ≤ Hmax(x, p),
the implicit ODE (4.8) can equivalently be written as a differential inclusion (Fig. 4):
V ′(x) ∈
{
F−(x, V, p) , F+(x, V, p)
}
. (4.15)
Remark 4.2. Recalling (4.1), we observe that
• The value V ′ = F+(x, V, p) ≥ ξ♯(x, p) corresponds to the choice of an optimal control
such that x˙ < 0.
• The value V ′ = F−(x, V, p) ≤ ξ♯(x, p) corresponds to the choice of an optimal control
such that x˙ > 0.
• When rV = Hmax(x, p), then the value V ′ = F+(x, V, p) = F−(x, V, p) = ξ♯(x, p)
corresponds to the unique control such that x˙ = 0.
Since ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is concave down, the functions F± satisfy the following monotonicity
properties (Fig. 4)
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Figure 1: In the case where (λ + r)x − (λ + µ)px < 1, the the Hamiltonian function ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p)
has a global maximum Hmax(x, p). For rV ≤ Hmax, the values F−(x, V, p) ≤ ξ♯(x, p) ≤ F+(x, V, p)
are well defined.
(MP) For any fixed x, p, the map V 7→ F+(x, V, p) is decreasing, while V 7→ F−(x, V, p) is
increasing.
For V ′ = F−, the second ODE in (4.8) can be written as
p′(x) = G−
(
x, V (x), p(x)
)
,
where
G−(x, V, p)
.
=
(r + λ)(p − 1)
Hξ
(
x, F−(x, V, p), p
) ≤ 0 . (4.16)
4.1 Construction of a solution.
Consider the function
W (x)
.
=
1
r
L
(
(r − µ)x
)
, (4.17)
with the understanding that W (x) = +∞ if (r − µ)x ≥ 1. Notice that W (x) is the total cost
of keeping the debt constantly equal to x (in which case there would be no bankruptcy and
hence p ≡ 1).
Moreover, denote by (VB(·), pB(·)) the solution to the system of ODEs
V ′(x) = F−(x, V (x), p(x)) ,
p′(x) = G−(x, V (x), p(x)) ,
(4.18)
with terminal conditions
V (x∗) = B, p(x∗) = θ(x∗) . (4.19)
Next, consider the point
x1
.
= inf
{
x ∈ [0, x∗] ; VB(x) < W (x)
}
, (4.20)
14
V
W
V
BB
0 1
r−µ
x
1
*x
1
Figure 2: Constructing the equilibrium solution in feedback form. For an initial value of the debt
x(0) ≤ x1, the debt increases until it reaches x1, then it is held at the constant value x1. If the initial
debt is x(0) > x1, the debt keeps increasing until it reaches bankruptcy in finite time.
and call V1(·) the solution to the backward Cauchy problemV
′(x) = F−(x, V (x), 1) , x ∈ [0, x1],
V (x1) = W (x1).
(4.21)
We will show that a feedback equilibrium solution to the debt management problem is obtained
as follows (see Fig. 4.1).
V ∗(x) =

V1(x) if x ∈ [0, x1],
VB(x) if x ∈ [x1, x
∗].
(4.22)
p∗(x) =

1, if x ∈ [0, x1],
pB(x), if x ∈ ]x1, x
∗].
(4.23)
u∗(x) =

argmin
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)−
(V ∗)′(x)
p∗(x)
ω
}
, if x 6= x1,
(r − µ)x1, if x = x1 .
(4.24)
Theorem 4.3. Assume that the cost function L satisfies the assumptions (A), and moreover
L((r−µ)x∗) > rB. Then the functions V ∗, p∗, u∗ in (4.22)–(4.24) are well defined, and provide
an equilibrium solution to the debt management problem, in feedback form.
Proof.
1. The solution of (4.18)-(4.19) satisfies the obvious bounds
V ′ ≥ 0, p′ ≤ 0, V (x) ≤ B, p(x) ∈ [θ(x∗), 1].
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We begin by proving that the function VB is well defined and strictly positive for x ∈ ]x1, x
∗].
To prove that
VB(x) > 0 for all x ∈]x1, x
∗] ,
assume, on the contrary, that VB(y) = 0 for some y > x1 ≥ 0. By the properties of the
function F− (see Fig. 4) it follows
F−(x, V, p) ≤ C2V , (4.25)
for some constant C2 and all x ∈ [y, x
∗], p ∈ [θ(x∗), 1]. Hence, for any solution of (4.18),
V (y) = 0 implies V (x) = 0 for all x ≥ y, providing a contradiction.
Next, observe that the functions F−, G− are locally Lipschitz continuous as long as 0 ≤
V < Hmax(x, p). Moreover, V (x) < W (x) implies
V (x) < W (x) = Hmax(x, 1) ≤ Hmax(x, p(x)).
Therefore, the functions VB, pB are well defined on the interval [x1, x
∗].
2. If x1 = 0 the construction of the functions V
∗, p∗, u∗ is already completed in step 1.. In
the case where x1 > 0, we claim that the function V1 is well defined and satisfies
0 < V1(x) < W (x) for 0 < x < x1 . (4.26)
Indeed, if V1(y) = 0 for some y > 0, the Lipschitz property (4.25) again implies that
V1(x) = 0 for all x ≥ y. This contradicts the terminal condition in (4.21).
To complete the proof of our claim (4.26), it suffices to show that
W ′(x) < F−(x,W (x), 1) for all x ∈ ]0, x1]. (4.27)
This is true because
W ′(x) =
r − µ
r
L′
(
r − µ)x
)
=
r − µ
r
ξ♯(x, 1) < ξ♯(x, 1)
= F−
(
x,Hmax(x, 1), 1
)
= F−(x,W (x), 1).
3. In the remaining steps, we show that V ∗, p∗, u∗ provide an equilibrium solution. Namely,
they satisfy the properties (i)-(ii) in Definition 4.1.
To prove (i), call V (·) the value function for the optimal control problem (4.4)-(4.5).
For any initial value, x(0) = x0, in both cases x0 ∈ [0, x1] and x0 ∈ ]x1, x
∗], the feedback
control u∗ in (4.24) yields the cost V ∗(x0). This implies
V (x0) ≤ V
∗(x0) .
To prove the converse inequality we need to show that, for any measurable control u :
[0,+∞[ 7→ [0, 1], calling t 7→ x(t) the solution to
x˙ =
(
λ+ r
px1(x)
− λ− µ
)
x−
u(t)
px1(x)
, x(0) = x0, (4.28)
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one has ∫ Tb
0
e−rtL(u(t))dt + e−rTbB ≥ V ∗(x0), (4.29)
where
Tb = inf
{
t ≥ 0 ; x(t) = x∗
}
is the bankruptcy time (possibly with Tb = +∞).
For t ∈ [0, Tb], consider the absolutely continuous function
φu(t)
.
=
∫ t
0
e−rsL(u(s))ds + e−rtV ∗(x(t)).
At any Lebesgue point t of u(·), we compute
d
dt
φu(t) = e−rt
[
L(u(t))− rV ∗(x(t)) + (V ∗)′(x(t)) · x˙(t)
]
= e−rt
[
L(u(t))− rV ∗(x(t)) + (V ∗)′(x(t))
((
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ
)
x(t)−
u(t)
p∗(x(t))
)]
≥ e−rt
[
min
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)−
(V ∗)′(x(t))
p∗(x(t))
ω
}
+
(
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ
)
x(t)(V ∗)′(x(t)) − rV ∗(x(t))
]
= e−rt
[
H
(
x(t), (V ∗)′(x(t)), p∗(x(t))
)
− rV ∗(x(t))
]
= 0.
Therefore,
V ∗(x0) = φ
u(0) ≤ lim
t→Tb−
φu(t) =
∫ Tb
0
e−rtL(u(t))dt + e−rTbB,
proving (4.29).
4. It remains to check (ii). The case x0 = 0 is trivial. Two main cases will be considered.
CASE 1: x0 ∈ ]0, x1]. Then there exists a solution t 7→ x(t) of (4.6) such that p(t) = 1
and x(t) ∈ ]0, x1] for all t > 0. Moreover,
lim
t→+∞
x(t) = x1 .
In this case, Tb = +∞ and (4.7) holds.
CASE 2: x0 ∈]x1, x
∗]. Then x(t) > x1 for all t ∈ [0, Tb]. This implies
x˙(t) = Hξ(x(t), VB(x(t)), pB(x(t))) .
From the second equation in (4.8) it follows
p˙(t) = p′(x(t))x˙(t) = (r + λ)(p(t)− 1),
d
dt
ln(1− p(x(t))) = (r + λ) .
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Therefore, for every t ∈ [0, Tb] one has
p(x(0)) = 1− (1− p(x(t))) · e−(r+λ)t.
Letting t→ Tb we obtain
p(x0) = 1− (1− θ(x
∗))) · e−(r+λ)Tb ,
proving (4.7).
Remark 4.4. The construction described at (4.22)–(4.24) uniquely determines a feedback equi-
librium solution to the debt management problem.
In general, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that a second solution exists. Indeed,
if the solution VB , pB of (4.18)-(4.19) can be prolonged backwards to the entire interval [0, x
∗],
then we could replace (4.22)-(4.23) simply by V ∗(x) = VB(x), p
∗(x) = pB(x) for all x ∈ [0, x
∗].
This would yield a second solution.
We claim that no other solutions can exist. This is based on the fact that the graphs of W
and VB cannot have any other intersection, in addition to 0 and x1. Indeed, assume on the
contrary that W (x2) = VB(x2) for some 0 < x2 < x1 (see Fig. 4.1). Since pB(x2) < 1 and
W ′(x2) ≤ V
′
B(x2), the inequalities
rW (x2) = H(x2,W
′(x2), 1) < H(x2,W
′(x2), pB(x2)) ≤ H(x2, V
′
B(x2), pB(x2)) = rVB(x2)
yield a contradiction.
Next, let V †, p† be any equilibrium solution and define
x†
.
= sup
{
x ∈ [0, x∗] ; p(x) = 1
}
.
Then
• On ]x†, x∗] the functions V †, p† provide a solution to the backward Cauchy problem
(4.18)-(4.19).
• On ]0, x†] the function V † provides the value function for the optimal control problem
minimize:
∫ ∞
0
e−rtL(u(t)) dt
subject to the dynamics (with p ≡ 1)
x˙ = (r − µ)x− u ,
and the state constraint x(t) ∈ [0, x†] for all t ≥ 0.
The above implies V
†(x) = VB(x), if x ∈ [x
†, x∗],
V †(x) ≤ W (x), if x ∈ [0, x†].
Since V † must be continuous at the point x2, by the previous analysis this is possible only if
x2 = 0 or x2 = x1.
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Figure 3: By the monotonicity properties of the Hamiltonian function H in (4.9), the graphs of VB
and W cannot have a second intersection at a point x2 > 0.
5 Dependence on the bankruptcy threshold x∗.
In this section we study the behavior of the value function VB when the maximum size x
∗ of
the debt, at which bankruptcy is declared, becomes very large.
For a given x∗ > 0, we denote by VB(·, x
∗), pB(·, x
∗) the solution to the system (4.18) with
terminal data (4.19). Letting x∗ → ∞, we wish to understand whether the value function
VB remains positive, or approaches zero uniformly on bounded sets. Toward this goal, we
introduce the constant
M1
.
=
2rB
(r − µ)L′(0)
. (5.1)
From (4.8) and (4.9) it follows
V ′B(x, x
∗)
pB(x, x∗)
≤
rVB(x, x
∗)
(r − µ)x− 1
.
In turn, if x∗ > M1, this implies
V ′B(x, x
∗)
pB(x, x∗)
≤ L′(0), for all x ∈ [M1, x
∗] .
Calling u = u∗(x) the optimal feedback control, by (2.11) we have
u∗(x) = 0, for all x ∈
[
M1, x
∗
]
. (5.2)
In this case, the Hamiltonian function takes a simpler form, namely
H(x, V ′, p) =
[
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p
]
·
V ′x
p
,
Hξ(x, V
′, p) =
[
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p
]
x .
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Therefore, the system of ODEs (4.18) can be written as
V ′ =
rp
[(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p]x
V ,
p′ = (λ+ r) ·
p(p− 1)
[(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p]x
.
(5.3)
The second ODE of in (5.3) is equivalent to
d
dx
ln
( (1− p(x))r−µ
p(x)r+λ
)
=
r + λ
x
.
Solving backward the above ODE with the terminal data p(x∗) = θ(x∗), we obtain
pB(x, x
∗) =
θ(x∗)x∗
x
·
(
1− pB(x, x
∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r−µ
r+λ
for all x ∈
[
M1, x
∗
]
. (5.4)
Therefore,
pB(x, x
∗) ≥
(
θ(x∗)x∗
x
) r+λ
r−µ
1 +
(
θ(x∗)x∗
x
) r+λ
r−µ
for all x ∈
[
M1, x
∗
]
. (5.5)
Different cases will be considered, depending on the properties of the function θ(·). By obvious
modeling considerations, we shall always assume
θ(x) ∈ [0, 1], θ′(x) ≤ x for all x ≥ 0.
We first study the case where θ has compact support. Recall that M1 is the constant in (5.1).
Lemma 5.1. Assume that
θ(x) = 0 for all x ≥M2 , (5.6)
for some constant M2 ≥ M1. Then, for any x
∗ > M2, the solution VB(·, x
∗), pB(·, x
∗) of
(4.18)-(4.19) satisfies
VB(x, x
∗) = B and pB(x, x
∗) = 0 for all x ∈
[
M2, x
∗
]
.
Proof. By (5.4) and (5.6), for every x∗ > M2 one has
pB(x, x
∗) = 0 for all x ∈
[
M2, x
∗
]
.
Inserting this into the first ODE in (5.3), we obtain
V ′B(x, x
∗) = 0.
In turn, this yields VB(x, x
∗) = B for all x ∈
[
M2, x
∗
]
. This means that bankruptcy instantly
occurs if the debt reaches M2.
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Next, we now consider that case where θ(x) > 0 for all x.
θ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0,∞[ . (5.7)
Lemma 5.2. If x∗ > M1 and θ(x
∗) > 0, then
VB(x, x
∗) = B ·
(
pB(x, x
∗)x
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
r−µ
for all x ∈
[
M1, x
∗
]
. (5.8)
In particular, for x ∈
[
M1, x
∗
]
one has
B ·
(
1 +
(
θ(x∗)x∗
x
) r+λ
r−µ
)− r
r+λ
≤ VB(x, x
∗) ≤ B ·
( x
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
r−µ
. (5.9)
Proof. Observe that x 7→ pB(x, x
∗) is a strictly decreasing function of x. For a fixed value of
x∗, let p 7→ χ(p) : [θ(x∗), 1[ 7→ [0, x∗] be the inverse function of pB(·, x
∗). From (5.3), a direct
computation yields
d
dp
VB(χ(p), x
∗) =
rp
[(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p]χ(p)
· VB(χ(p), x
∗) · χ′(p) ,
d
dp
pB(χ(p), x
∗) = (λ+ r) ·
p(p− 1)
[(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p] · χ(p)
· χ′(p) = 1 .
(5.10)
From (5.10) it follows
d
dp
lnVB(χ(p), x
∗) =
r
λ+ r
·
1
p− 1
.
Solving the above ODE with the terminal data VB(x
∗, x∗) = B, pB(x
∗, x∗) = θ(x∗), we obtain
VB(χ(p), x
∗) =
(
1− p
1− θ(x∗)
) r
r+λ
B , (5.11)
hence
VB(x, x
∗) =
(
1− pB(x, x
∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r
r+λ
B.
Recalling (5.4), a direct computation yields (5.8). The upper and lower bounds for VB(x, x
∗)
in (5.9) now follow from (5.5) and the inequality pB(x, x
∗) ≤ 1.
Corollary 5.3. Assume that
lim sup
x→+∞
θ(x)x = +∞. (5.12)
Then the value function V ∗ = V ∗(x, x∗) satisfies
lim
x∗→+∞
V (x, x∗) = 0 for all x ≥ 0 . (5.13)
Indeed, for x ≥M1 we have V (x, x
∗) = VB(x, x
∗), and (5.13) follows from the second inequality
in (5.9). When x < M1, since the map x 7→ V (x, x
∗) is nondecreasing, we have
0 ≤ lim
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) ≤ lim
x∗→∞
V (M1, x
∗) = 0 .
21
Corollary 5.4. Assume that
R
.
= lim sup
x→+∞
θ(x) · x < +∞. (5.14)
Then
VB(x, x
∗) ≥ B ·
(
1 +
(
R
x
) r+λ
r−µ
)− r
r+λ
for all x∗ > x > M1 . (5.15)
Moreover, the followings holds.
(i) If
θ′(x)
θ(x)
+
1
x
≥ 0 and θ′(x) ≤ 0 for all x > 0 (5.16)
then
inf
x∗>0
VB(x, x
∗) = lim
x∗→∞
VB(x, x
∗) > 0 for all x ≥M1 . (5.17)
(ii) Assume that there exist 0 < δ < 1 such that
δ ·
θ′(x)
θ(x)
+
1
x
< 0 (5.18)
for all x sufficiently large. Then, for each x > M1, there exists an optimal value x
∗ =
x∗(x) such that
VB(x, x
∗(x)) = inf
x∗≥0
VB(x, x
∗). (5.19)
Proof. It is clear that (5.15) is a consequence of (5.9) and (5.14). We only need to prove (i)
and (ii). For a fixed x ≥M1, we consider the functions of the variable x
∗ alone:
Y (x∗)
.
= VB(x, x
∗), q(x∗)
.
= pB(x, x
∗).
Using (5.8) and (5.4), we obtain
Y ′(x∗)
Y (x∗)
=
r
r − µ
·
(
q′(x∗)
q(x∗)
−
[θ′(x∗)
θ(x∗)
+
1
x∗
])
, (5.20)
and
q′(x∗)
q(x∗)
=
θ′(x∗)x∗ + θ(x∗)
θ(x∗)x∗
+
r − µ
r + λ
·
( −q′(x∗)
1− q(x∗)
+
θ′(x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
)
. (5.21)
This implies
q′(x∗)
q(x∗)
−
[
θ′(x∗)
θ(x∗)
+
1
x∗
]
=
 1
1 + r−µ
r+λ ·
q(x∗)
1−q(x∗)
− 1
 · [θ′(x∗)
θ(x∗)
+
1
x∗
]
+
r − µ
(r + λ)
(
1 + r−µ
r+λ ·
q(x∗)
1−q(x∗)
) · θ′(x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
. (5.22)
If (5.16) holds, then (5.20) and (5.22) imply
Y ′(x∗)
Y (x∗)
=
q′(x∗)
q(x∗)
−
[θ′(x∗)
θ(x∗)
+
1
x∗
]
≤ 0 for all x∗ > x ≥M1.
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Hence the function Y is non-increasing. This proves (5.17).
To prove (ii), we observe that
lim sup
x∗→∞
 1
1 + r−µ
r+λ ·
q(x∗)
1−q(x∗)
− 1
 < 0 , lim
x∗→∞
θ(x∗) = 0 .
Hence (5.18) and (5.22) imply
q′(x∗)
q(x∗)
−
[
θ′(x∗)
θ(x∗)
−
1
x∗
]
> 0,
for all x∗ sufficiently large. By (5.20) this yields
Y ′(x∗)
Y (x∗)
> 0
for all x∗ large enough. Hence there exists some particular value x∗(x) ≥ x where the function
x∗ 7→ Y (x∗) = VB(x, x
∗) attains its global minimum. This yields (5.19).
6 Dependence on x∗ in the stochastic case
In this section we study how the value function depends on the bankruptcy threshold x∗, in the
stochastic case where σ > 0. Extensions of Corollaries 5.3 and 5.4, will be proved, constructing
upper and lower bounds for the solution V (·, x∗), p(·, x∗) of the system (2.15)-(2.16), in the
form
V2(x) ≤ V (x, x
∗) ≤ V1(x), p1(x) ≤ p(x, x
∗) ≤ p2(x). (6.1)
1. We begin by constructing a suitable pair of functions V1, p1. Let (p1, V˜1) be the solution
to the backward Cauchy problem
rV˜1(x) =
(λ+ r
p1
+ σ2
)
xV˜ ′1 ,
(r + λ)(p1 − 1) =
(λ+ r
p1
+ σ2
)
xp′1 ,

V˜1(x
∗) = B,
p1(x
∗) = θ(x∗).
(6.2)
This solution satisfies
p1(x) =
θ(x∗)x∗
x
·
(
1− p1(x)
1− θ(x∗)
)σ2+λ+r
λ+r
, lim
x→0+
p1(x) = 1 , (6.3)
V˜1(x) = B ·
(
1− p1(x)
1− θ(x∗)
) r
r+λ
, lim
x→0+
V˜1(x) = 0 . (6.4)
Using (6.2) and (6.3) one obtains
−1 = p′1(x) ·
(
x
p1(x)
+
σ2 + r + λ
r + λ
·
x
1− p1(x)
)
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= p′1(x) ·
 x
p1(x)
+
σ2 + r + λ
r + λ
·
1− θ(x∗)
(θ(x∗)x∗)
r+λ
r+λ+σ2
·
x
σ2
r+λ+σ2
p1(x)
λ+r
λ+r+σ2
 .
Since p1 is monotone decreasing, it follows that p
′′
1(x) > 0 for all x ∈ ]0, x
∗[ . In turn, this
yields
(r + λ)(1 − p1) +
(λ+ r
p1
+ σ2
)
xp′1 +
σ2x2
2
p′′1 > 0 .
Recalling (2.18), we have
(r + λ)(1− p1) +Hξ(x, ξ, p1)p
′
1 +
σ2x2
2
p′′1 > 0 for all ξ ≥ 0. (6.5)
Next, differentiating both sides of the first ODE in (6.2), we obtain(
r − σ2 −
λ+ r
p1
+
(λ+ r)p′1
p21
x
)
· V˜ ′1 =
(
λ+ r
p1
+ σ2
)
xV˜ ′′1 for all x ∈ ]0, x
∗[ .
This implies
V˜ ′′1 (x) < 0 for all x ∈ ]0, x
∗[ .
Recalling (2.17) and (6.2), we obtain
− rV˜1 +H(x, V˜
′
1 , p1) +
σ2x2
2
V˜ ′′1 < 0 . (6.6)
When x ≥ 1
λ+r , the map p 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is monotone decreasing. Defining
V1(x)
.
=

V˜ ( 1
r+λ ) for x ∈
[
0, 1
r+λ
]
,
V˜ (x) for x ∈
[
1
r+λ , x
∗
]
,
we thus have
− rV1(x) +H(x, V
′
1(x), q) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′1 (x) ≤ 0 for all q ≥ p1(x) . (6.7)
2. We now construct the functions V2, p2. Defining
p˜2(x)
.
=
1
x
(
θ(x∗)x∗ +
2
r − µ
)
,
a straightforward computation yields
p˜′2(x) = −
p˜2(x)
x
< 0 , p˜′′2(x) = 2 ·
p˜2(x)
x2
.
Set
x2
.
= θ(x∗)x∗ +
2
r − µ
, (6.8)
and consider the continuous function
p2(x) = min
{
1, p˜2(x)
}
. (6.9)
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For x ∈ [0, x2[ one has p2(x) = 1 and hence
(r + λ)(1 − p2) +Hξ(x, ξ, p2)p
′
2 +
σ2x2
2
p′′2 = 0 .
On the other hand, for x ∈]x2, x
∗[ and ξ ≥ 0, one has p2(x) = p˜2(x) < 1, and
Hξ(x, ξ, p2) ≥
(λ+ r)x− 1
p2
+(σ2−λ−µ)x ≥ (r−µ)x1− 1 = (r−µ)θ(x
∗)x∗+1 ≥ 0 .
(6.10)
Recalling (2.18), we get
(r + λ)(1− p2) +Hξ(x, ξ, p2)p
′
2 +
σ2x2
2
p′′2
≤ (r + λ)(1 − p2) +
[(λ+ r)x− 1
p2
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)x
]
p′2(x) +
σ2x2
2
p′′2
= (r + λ)(1 − p2)−
[(λ+ r)x− 1
p2
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)x
]
·
p2(x)
x
+ σ2p2
= (r + λ)(1 − p2)−
[
(λ+ r)−
1
x
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)p2
]
+ σ2p2
=
1
x
− (r − µ)p2 = −
(r − µ)θ(x∗)x∗
x
−
1
x
< 0 .
In particular,
(r + λ)(1 − p2) +Hξ(x, ξ, p2) · p
′
2 +
σ2x2
2
p′′2 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ ]0, x
∗[, ξ ≥ 0 . (6.11)
Next, define
V2(x)
.
= (1− p2(x))B for all x ∈ [0, x
∗] . (6.12)
For all x ∈ [0, x2], we thus have V2(x) = 0, and hence
− rV2 +H(x, V
′
2 , q) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2 = H(x, 0, q) = 0 for all q ∈]0, 1] . (6.13)
On the other hand, for x ∈ ]x2, x
∗] we have
V ′2(x) = B ·
p2(x)
x
> 0 and V ′′2 (x) = − 2B ·
p2(x)
x2
.
Recalling (2.17), (6.9), (6.10) and (6.8), we estimate
−rV2 +H(x, V
′
2 , p2) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2 ≥ − rV2 +
((λ+ r)x− 1
p2
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)x
)
V ′2 +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2
= B ·
[
rp2 − r +
(
λ+ r −
1
x
+ (σ2 − λ− µ)p2(x)
)
− σ2p2
]
= B ·
(
λ−
1
x
− (λ+ µ− r)p2
)
= B ·
[
λ(1− p2(x)) + (r − µ)p2(x)−
1
x
]
> 0
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for all x ∈ ]x2, x
∗[.
Recalling (6.8), one has
(λ+ r)x > 1 for all x ∈]x2, x
∗] .
Therefore the map p → H(x, V ′2(x), p) is monotone decreasing on [0, 1], for all x ∈]x2, x
∗].
This implies
−rV2 +H(x, V
′
2 , q) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ ]x2, x
∗], q ∈]0, p2(x)] .
Together with (6.13), we finally obtain
− rV2(x) +H(x, V
′
2(x), q) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2 (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈]0, x
∗[ , q ∈]0, p2(x)] . (6.14)
Relying on (6.5), (6.6), (6.11) and (6.14), and using the same comparison argument as in the
proof of Theorem 3.1 we now prove
Theorem 6.1. In addition to (A1), assume that σ > 0 and θ(x∗) > 0. Then the system (2.15)
with boundary conditions (2.16) admits a solution (V (·, x∗), p(·, x∗)) satisfying the bounds (6.1)
for all x ∈ [0, x∗].
Proof.
1. Recalling D in (3.6), we claim that the domain
D0 =
{
(V, p) ∈ D
∣∣∣ (V (x), p(x)) ∈ [V2(x), V1(x)]× [p1(x), p2(x)], for all x ∈ [0, x∗]}
(6.15)
is positively invariant for the semigroup {St}t≥0, generated by the parabolic system (3.3)-
(3.4). Namely:
St(D
0) ⊆ D0 for all t ≥ 0 .
Indeed, from the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have
px(t, x) ≤ 0 ≤ Vx(t, x) for all t > 0, x ∈]0, x
∗[ . (6.16)
We now observe that
(i) For any V (·, ·) with Vx ≥ 0, by (6.5) the function p(t, x) = p1(x) is a subsolution of
the second equation in (3.2). Similarly, by (6.11), the function p(t, x) = p2(x) is a
supersolution.
(ii) For any p(·, ·) with p ∈ [0, 1] and px ≤ 0, by (6.7) the function V (t, x) = V1(x)
is a supersolution of the first equation in (3.2). Similarly, by (6.14), the function
V (t, x) = V2(x) is a subsolution.
Together, (i)-(ii) imply the positive invariance of the domain D0.
2. Using the same argument as in step 4 of the proof of Theorem 3.1, we conclude that the
system (2.15)-(2.16) admits a solution (V, P ) ∈ D0.
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Corollary 6.2. Let the assumptions in Theorem 6.1 hold. If
lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s) s = +∞,
then, for all x ≥ 0, the value function V (·, x∗) satisfies
lim
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) = 0. (6.17)
Proof. Using (4.3), (6.4) and Theorem 6.1, we have the estimate
V (x, x∗) ≤ V1(x) = B ·
(
1− p1(x)
1− θ(x∗)
) r
r+λ
≤ B ·
( x
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
r+λ+σ2
for all x ≥ 1
r+λ . This implies that (6.17) holds for all x ≥
1
r+λ . Since x 7→ V (x, x
∗) is monotone
increasing, we then have
0 ≤ lim
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) ≤ lim
x∗→∞
V
(
1
r + λ
, x∗
)
= 0 for all x ∈
[
0,
1
r + λ
]
.
This completes the proof of (6.17).
Corollary 6.3. Let the assumptions in Theorem 6.1 hold. If
C1
.
= lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s) s < +∞,
then
lim inf
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) ≥ B ·
(
1−
C2
x
)
for all x > M2 , (6.18)
where the constants C2,M2 are defined as
C2
.
= C1 +
2
r − µ
and M2
.
=
λ+ µ− r
λ
C1 +
2λ+ µ− r
λ(r − µ)
+ 1 .
Proof. This follows from (6.9), (6.12) and Theorem 6.1.
7 Concluding remarks
If we allow x∗ = +∞, then the equations (4.8) admit the trivial solution V (x) = 0, p(x) = 1,
for all x ≥ 0. This corresponds to a Ponzi scheme, producing a debt whose size grows
exponentially, without bounds. In practice, this is not realistic because there is a maximum
amount of liquidity that the market can supply. It is interesting to understand what happens
when this bankruptcy threshold x∗ is very large.
Our analysis has shown that three cases can arise, depending on the fraction θ of outstanding
capital that lenders can recover.
(i) If lim
s→+∞
θ(s) s = +∞, then it is convenient to choose x∗ as large as possible. By delaying
the time of bankruptcy, the expected cost for the borrower, exponentially discounted in
time, approaches zero.
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(iii) If lim
s→+∞
θ(s) s < +∞ and (5.16) holds then it is still convenient to choose x∗ as large as
possible. However,by delaying the time of bankruptcy, the cost to the borrower remains
uniformly positive.
(iii) If lim
s→+∞
θ(s) s < +∞ and (5.18) holds, then for every initial value x0 of the debt there
is a choice x∗(x0) of the bankruptcy threshold which is optimal for the borrower.
Examples corresponding to three cases (i)–(iii) are obtained by taking
θ(s) = min
{
1,
R0
sα
}
(7.1)
with 0 < α < 1, α = 1, or α > 1, respectively.
It is important to observe that the choice of the optimal bankruptcy threshold x∗ is never
“time consistent”. Indeed, at the beginning of the game the borrower announces that he will
declare bankruptcy when the debt reaches size x∗. Based on this information, the lenders
determine the discounted price of bonds. However, when the time Tb comes when x(Tb) = x
∗,
it is never convenient for the borrower to declare bankruptcy. It is the creditors, or an external
authority, that must enforce termination of the game.
To see this, assume that at time Tb when x(Tb) = x
∗ the borrower announces that he has
changed his mind, and will declare bankruptcy only at the later time T ′b when the debt reaches
x(T ′b) = 2x
∗. If he chooses a control u(t) = 0 for t > Tb, his discounted cost will be
e−(T
′
b
−Tb)rB < B.
This new strategy is thus always convenient for the borrower. On the other hand, it can be
much worse for the lenders. Indeed, consider an investor having a unit amount of outstanding
capital at time Tb. If bankruptcy is declared at time Tb, he will recover the amount θ(x
∗).
However, if bankruptcy is declared at the later time T ′b, his discounted payoff will be∫ T ′
b
Tb
(r + λ)e−(r+λ)(t−Tb) dt+ e−(r+λ)(T
′
b
−Tb)θ(2x∗).
To appreciate the difference, consider the deterministic case, assuming that θ(·) is the function
in (7.1), with α ≥ 1, and that x∗ ≥M1. By the analysis at the beginning of Section 5, we have
u∗(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [x∗, 2x∗]. Replacing x∗ with 2x∗ in (5.4) we obtain that the solution to
(5.3) with terminal data
p(2x∗) = θ(2x∗) =
R0
(2x∗)α
satisfies
pB(x
∗, 2x∗) = 2θ(2x∗) ·
(
1− pB(x
∗, 2x∗)
1− θ(2x∗)
) r−µ
r+λ
< 2θ(2x∗) = 21−αθ(x∗) ≤ θ(x∗) .
If the investors had known in advance that bankruptcy is declared at x = 2x∗ (rather than at
x = x∗), the bonds would have fetched a smaller price.
In conclusion, if the bankruptcy threshold x∗ is chosen by the debtor, the only Nash equilibrium
can be x∗ = +∞. In this case, the model still allows bankruptcy to occur, when total debt
approaches infinity in finite time.
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